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a b s t r a c t
If you have seen the movie ‘The Servant’, you may recognize the feeling. How a servant can
invade her master’s environment and gradually take control. The scenario is tightly
connected with emotions: vulnerability of jurisdiction, abuse of culture, perverted reci-
procity, lost autonomy and, finally, of decay. It takes little imagination to recognise the first
signs of this scenario in a large number of IT-based environments, where service trans-
forms itself from servant to master. Examples are abundant. My standard university
work station has been configured to prevent me doing my work (researching the legal
aspects of employing and deploying new information services). Inquiry consistently
unearths argumentations of security and efficiency. With equal consistency, these argu-
mentations refer to the service provider’s security and efficiency, not those of the principal
or the user. I wonder whether the ‘Servant’ comparison holds true for the judiciary and it’s
supporting computerization staff. That is the state of affairs referred to in the title of this
article. The importance of the problems connected with it is too grave to put aside without
further thought or reflection. I will first (i) give a short description of the recent organisa-
tional developments within the judiciary in the Netherlands, followed by (ii) a short survey
of the currently available technology and (iii) an impression of things to come. From there
(iv) I will deduce certain trends, and (v) analyse those trends in the light of the question
how dependent the judiciary is becoming upon its information services. I will conclude
that the reciprocities within and between the judiciary’s sub-organisations represent great
interest. An afterthought (vi) will conclude the paper and offer a few comparisons with
Australia, the USA and the UK.
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Let me start off with a short outline of the organizational
changes that resulted from the introduction of computeriza-
tion in the judiciary in the recent past in the Netherlands.
These events were set into motion during the 1990s. In this
era it became apparent that the increasing administrative ac-
countability of the Dutch Department of Justice led to an in-
creasing pressure, urging to control expenditures and to
evaluate their effectiveness. This movement yielded friction
concerning the professional meaning of concepts such as0267-3649/$ – see front matter ª 2007 Aernout Schmidt. Published
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2007.03.006‘judicial independency’ and ‘ministerial accountability’. The
discussion focused on how organized supervision of expendi-
ture and quality would affect the judge’s constitutional inde-
pendence. Discussions were held on administration and
judicial interdependencies (Ingelse-Koers, 1998), on manage-
ment and the value of a separate, professional organisation
for the judiciary. Finance models were drafted, officials
appointed, projects launched and recommendations commis-
sioned. Budgets were outlined and laws were drafted (result-
ing in the ‘Wet Raad voor de Rechtspraak’ [Law on the
Council of Justice] and the ‘Wet organisatie bestuur gerechten’by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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force on 1 January 2002). As recommended by the seminal re-
port ‘Rechtspraak bij de tijd’ (‘Modern Administration of
Justice’) by a Commission presided by Leemhuis, in 1998 the
creation of a ‘Council of the Judiciary’ was initiated which,
after preparatory work, was officially launched on 1 January
2002. By design, the responsibility for the Project’s Reinforce-
ment Judicial Organisation (PVRO) was both allocated to the
Council proper – which also assimilated the new IT organisa-
tional entities BISTRO (for Internet services) and IT Proeflakaal
(for testing innovative services), or became a responsibility
shared with the Public Prosecutor’s Office (ICTRO).
After a period of organisational innovation (and the inevi-
table rattling of the cage of existing and customary manage-
ment practices) a more clearly defined management
structure for the Council of the Judiciary and its courts was
established. It has become a dedicated legal Act: the ‘Law on
the Council of the Judiciary’ which encompasses the revision
of the traditional ‘Law on the Judicial Organisation’ (Wet RO).
Insofar as relevant for our subject, this Law states the fol-
lowing. The Council is entrusted with the support of the man-
agement of the courts and the supervision of the use of the
courts’ budgets. To carry out this task the Council is in partic-
ular concerned with, among other things, the computeriza-
tion, the supply of management information and the quality
of the administrative and managerial modus operandi of the
courts. To fulfil these goals the Council can give general orders
to the administrations of the courts, if management interests
do so require. Before issuing such an order, the Council asks
the Board of Representatives (comprising representatives
from the courts) to voice its views. By ministerial implement-
ing regulation, rules are set for financing the courts – in any
case pertaining to objective measurement of workload and
the way in which compliance with these rules in preceding pe-
riods will be taken into account when deciding on the budget.
The Council is duty bound to provide the Minister with ade-
quate information.
If the Law on the Council of the Judiciary accomplished
anything at all, and it accomplished a lot, it is the clarification
of the functional structures and administrative responsibili-
ties within the judiciary – also in the field of IT-support. Just
how far it leaves room for the Minister to influence the judi-
ciary depends on the interpretation of the updated Wet RO
and on the compliance practices to emerge.
2. A short survey of available technology
If one consults the literature on court technology, one will
often find empirical statements describing the state of affairs
in court technology, supplemented by opinions expressing ei-
ther the superiority or antiquity of the use of IT in the courts
(otherwise: Fabri and Langbroek, 2000). In the United States
a bi-annual conference is held on the subject, frequented by
a vast and diverse public of judges (often singing ICT-system
praise), social scientists (attempting to describe how the legal
organization employs IT), managers and economists (showing
how efficiency can be improved) as well as computer scien-
tists (eager to see their inventions being put to use). This bi-
annual conference is useful, since new opportunities ariseall the time and two year old knowledge of a descriptive IT-
related state of affairs is out-of-date almost instantly. Conse-
quently, such descriptions are at considerable risk of being
outdated even before they have made it to hardcopy. Never-
theless, a description – of the actual use of IT in the
judiciary – is an essential and non-omissible part of this over-
view. Especially since it gives the current context of the
development of the digitalization of the judiciary in the
Netherlands, id est 2006. The direction and extent of that
development have yet to emerge in practice.
Administrators and policymakers have very high expecta-
tions, even in a global sense. The World Bank, for instance has,
for a considerable time now, been of the opinion that (i) the
Rule of Law is a conditio sine qua non for a stable society and
(ii) that the use of courtroom technology will support the
establishment of the Rule of Law, even in the most unsavoury
of jurisdictions (Carothers, 2003). From that perspective the
assumption holds that computerization of the judiciary will
contribute to an improvement in the quality of the adjudica-
tion of justice and thereby to an amelioration of unstable legal
systems. In the Netherlands expectations of an improvement
of quality are also held, as is evident from the efforts the
Council of the Judiciary is making in the field of IT (see below).
However, since the Netherlands already has a high quality
judicial system compared with some jurisdictions that the
World Bank is interested in, there is scope for the Netherlands
to take a step backwards as well as one for the better. Does the
use of IT in the judiciary actually lead to an improvement of
the Rule of Law in the Netherlands (or influence it in any other
way)?
IT-support can mean a great many things. It may, for
instance, mean: the entire, complex, collection of IT-staff
(information-analysts, programmers, helpdesk-employees,
and system and network administrators), networks, com-
puters and programs that as a whole support, and in ever
increasing intensity even provide, the judiciary’s information
housekeeping. The virtual desktop (for the purposes of this
paper) is defined as everything that goes on behind the screen
of a judge’s computer at the workplace. With IT in the
judiciary I mean this virtual desktop.
The space reserved for this discourse permits me only to
give a brief outline of the virtual desktop available to the
Dutch judiciary in 2006. I have used among other (Dutch) sour-
ces the ‘Informatiseringsplan 2005–2008 van de Raad voor de
Rechtspraak’ (ICT-blueprint of the Council for the Judiciary
2005–2008; an internal publication, the version of 6 January
2005) and, with his consent and an expression of my gratitude,
the work of Ronald van den Hoogen, who is preparing a PhD
thesis on the subject from the perspective of Art 6 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human rights.
I will distinguish four separate characteristics of IT
services. I assume that the way one appreciates any
given instrument of the virtual desktop is related (i) to the
character of that instrument (i.e., its specific combination
of characteristics), (ii) to the expectations we hold of the
instrument’s functionality and (iii) to the extent in which
we accept the policy that is implemented in or realised by
that instrument. Every desktop instrument dictates. I under-
stand the term ‘policy’ to denote legal, management or
cultural rules that can be upheld with sanctions (like paper
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services tend to do).
Every instrument of the virtual desktop has four relevant
characteristics (the following conceptualization is inspired
by Douglas, 1970; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fodor, 1987;
North, 1990). These characteristics combine to form the
instrument’s character. So here every IT instrument is
assumed to have economic, administrative, individual and
collective traits. Sometimes one of those traits is so dominates
that it controls the instrument’s character (or its implied pol-
icy). I will now give an overview of the different parts that
make up the virtual desktop of the judiciary, sorted on its
dominant trait.
First, the main quality of economic instruments is that they
support the judiciary in achieving a higher efficiency. Com-
puters were conjured up to be proficient at maths and mathe-
matical programs have been a part of the desktop since the
very beginning. As long as they save time and provide results
that are backed by accepted models, they are acceptable.
On the virtual desktop of the judiciary in the Netherlands I
found the following programs to be of an economic nature:
calculation of interest (mathematical program for the calcula-
tion of the legal interest due on a claim), alimony-indexation
(mathematical program for the calculation of the indexation
of an alimony obligation), cantonal judge’s formula (used to
compute the maintenance allowances after divorce, based
on the so called cantonal judge’s formula), and calculation
of deadlines (used to compute whether certain legal terms
will be or have been exceeded). I consider software for print-
ing, sending e-mail, fax and IP-telephony to have a mainly
economic character. They are all part of the standard working
place, also for the Dutch judiciary.
Second, the foremost characteristic of an administrative in-
strument is that it supports its users to do their work within
certain (legal and policy-related) constraints. Administrative
instruments were developed in the wake of more economi-
cally oriented programs. As ever more economic instruments
were being put to use in supporting transactions, the aware-
ness grew that their use could be registered and processed
in order to gain insights that could be used for policy making
and enforcement. Potentially, every desktop application can
generate data that can be used for administrative purposes.
The level at which that actually happens determines the
administrative emphasis of that instrument. The level of
acceptance of the underlying distribution of competencies
and the built-in ‘policy’, together with the level of privacy pro-
tection and the accuracy of the interpretation of the data, all
play a role in the acceptability of the administrative aspect
of the application. At the moment, the judiciary in the Nether-
lands is working with large national administrative and case-
registration systems of venerable age.
It has become customary to refer to those systems using
acronyms. SAS, for ‘Strafrecht Administratie Systeem’ (Penal
law Administration System), assists in the litigation of Penal
cases. ARC (support for the magistrate, responsible for ade-
quate police research) supports the administration of prelim-
inary judicial research. NIAS (for New Appeal System)
supports the administration of Penal cases in appeal and
can visualize the completion times of those cases. ‘Berber’
supports the administrative adjudication and containsmodules for administrative justice, for the adjudication of ali-
ens, for tax law and for cases of the high administrative
courts. Finally, this category also contains the Civil Law sys-
tems ‘Civiel’, ‘NKP’, ‘Cirad/Rekest’ and ‘Bopzis’. These systems
support private law adjudication, register the data of the
plaintiffs, defendants and parties involved, the method of
conclusion and the completion times. Security software is
also part of such administrative instruments, for instance se-
curity-filters on Internet connections as well as auditing soft-
ware to ensure the virtual desktop is not overloaded or
corrupted and to track the cause of these problems should
they occur. These instruments generally report to system ad-
ministrators. An interesting case (in our context) has been the
judge who collected child pornography on his desktop and got
caught by the system administrator (and was later sentenced
by his fellow judges).
Third, an individual instrument’s most distinctive feature is
that it allows customisation. They support – like a painter’s
palette – creative activities. Ease of use and reliability are the
most important criteria, along with room for autonomy. Ap-
plications such as word processors and presentation software
are prime instances. A nice example of progress in the Nether-
lands was the judiciary’s migration from Microsoft Office 97 to
Microsoft Office 2003 scheduled for 2006.
Fourth, Collective instruments are characterized by the bun-
dling of powers through public or private networks with the
aim of achieving collective goals most commonly related to
the publication and dissemination of information. Search en-
gines (Google, Yahoo) and Wikis exhibit this characteristic
quite strongly. Collective instruments have only become
widespread since the advent of the Internet and the World
Wide Web (Google was established in 1998, Wikipedia in
2001). They have recently become available for projects, some-
time after the computerization of the judiciary began in the
Netherlands through the PVRO projects. Collective instru-
ments have a hybrid nature: one can discern, in general terms,
an editorial function, a contribution function and a users’
function.
Collective instruments are acceptable if both contributors
and users benefit from their use. Collective instrument are
found in the field of ICTRO (the availability of search engines
like Google through the virtual desktop) and, most notably in
the field of BISTRO (e.g., the website ‘Rechtspraak.nl’, a public
web-based information service which provides a great deal of
information on the Dutch legal system to the public; Porta Iuris
is the intranet portal of the judiciary itself, and as such is a col-
lective instrument; Intro is the collective noun for the nation-
wide intranet and the local intranets of the judiciary). The
goals of the intranet are improvement of internal communica-
tion, speeding up of information supply, improvement of
administrative processes, improvement in keeping hand-
books, guidelines, etc. kept up-to-date, increasing the accessi-
bility of employees as well as access to central applications
such as phonebooks, address books, etc.
3. Services to come
In 2002 the Council of Judiciary was apparently made respon-
sible for a veritable bran tub of responsibilities with various
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perceives this to be a risk factor which has led to some
commotion in the printed press which the Council voiced as
‘Dependence on IT’. According to Rik Sanders, in Computable
nr. 21, May 21, 2004 (p. 24) ‘‘stunning was the flop of the
Administrative system for criminal cases in appeal (HBS) in
2001, costing around thirteen million Euros’’.
The subject has been dealt with, as far as one can tell, quite
energetically and, with respect to its extent and level of com-
plexity, quite effectively too. If all goes according to plan, the
outdated systems will soon be replaced by more integrated
systems: GPS (Integrated Process System) and REIS (Informa-
tion System for the Judiciary). The construction and deploy-
ment of these services has fallen a little behind schedule,
but in projects of this scale that is to be expected. Such pro-
jects require high demands of IT-governance in the abilities
of the Council. More on that subject will be discussed later on.
In September 2003 the Project REIS started. Its goal is to
build or reshape IT-systems for Civil and Administrative
Law. The most important improvements are the use of digital
‘dossiers’ (filing), secure electronic messaging, integration (of
record tables) and the support of archives within a digital en-
vironment. Besides REIS, work is also underway on the ‘Basis
Advocatenregistratie/Landelijk Advocatentableau’ and on ‘Fi-
nancial Claims Online’. The Basic Advocatenregistratie con-
tains information concerning lawyers and law offices. It is
an initiative by the judiciary, the Dutch Order of Lawyers
and the Council for Legal Aid. The ‘Landelijk Advocatenta-
bleau’ contains information that is of interest to the judiciary,
such as: where payments are to be made and who are involved
in supervising bankruptcies, etc. As a part of Rechtspraak.nl
‘roljournaal’ (the case-roll journal) is being developed. This
free service allows lawyers that are listed in the ‘tableau’ to
consult the actual court’s case-roll through the Internet. The
case-roll states who is authorized to take control of a certain
case, a classification of pending cases, the names of plaintiffs
and defendants, names of involved barristers and the current
status of the case. ‘Roljournaal’ (Roll Journal) provides law of-
fices with an overview of all the pending cases that their firm
is involved in at a certain court and on a specific date. It also
provides the firm with some search options, for instance
searching on case number while allowing the history of the
case to be viewed and providing an overview of all actions
taken during the litigation process. It also allows the user to
search for data regarding the involved parties. The system is
meant to enhance efficiency within firms and at the court’s
registries. Digital access to the Roll should lead to the aban-
donment of Procurator services (required by local barristers
for barristers from another courts’ tableau, handling a case
that will be decided in the Procurator’s court) and should
turn the electronic exchange of messages in Private Law cases
finally into a reality (TK 2004–2005, 24 252, nr. 4).
The Integrated Penal Process System (GPS) will be the new
process system for Penal cases at the courts, exchanging the
paper dossier for an electronic version. A workflow manage-
ment system fulfils the role of case manager in GPS. The work-
flow attempts to makes sure that all necessary actions during
a process are taken in the right order and at the right time.
After completing one action, the workflow system calculates
which next step will be appropriate. This way, missinga deadline will be virtually impossible (that is: impossible by
design) and the currently expanding numbers of formal errors
are thus expected to diminish. Again, GPS is being developed
in a multi-staged approach.
In both Civil and Administrative Law serious thought is
given, in anticipation of REIS, to the possibilities for the
electronic exchange of messages. The discussion in Adminis-
trative Law is closely linked to the Law on Electronic Adminis-
trative Transactions. However, the law does not pertain to the
appeal before the administrative judge. The ‘minutes of clari-
fication’ accompanying the Law expressly state that the elec-
tronic way of filing an appeal before the administrative judge
should be in concordance with Civil and Penal Law. In every-
day practice though, a lot of the communication between
involved parties and the court is being conducted through
electronic means. The minister of Justice is currently discus-
sing with the Council of the Judiciary whether, how and under
what conditions electronic communication with the courts
should be made formal.
The judicial system as whole, of which the judiciary is but
a part, also intends to use IT-applications for processing and
presenting administrative and managerial information. In
the infoRM program this is done on the basis of a dataware-
house concept. Management information is created on de-
mand from the information in the warehouse, based on the
criteria set by the user. The stated goal is to have the courts
fulfil their information needs with ever less effort. But, com-
parison of the performance of the courts should also become
easier. Let me translate from the ‘Werkplan van de Raad
voor 2006’ mentioned before, p. 18:.
The infoRM program aims to enhance management and strategic
information in the adjudication of justice. ‘Stuurhut’ (Control
cabin) and Datawarehouse are part of infoRM. Control cabin
and Datawarehouse collect and present management informa-
tion about the operation of the different process systems. In
2006, Control cabin will be completed and will have an interface
with the Financial and HRM data of REIS and GPS.using a tem-
porary solution and later through Datawarehouse. In order to
govern reliability and timeliness of the information service we
will begin to implement a dedicated controlling organization.
4. Trends
The development of the virtual desktop of the judiciary thus
marks a revolution. Why? During the Industrial Revolution
a general displeasure was felt because of the substitution of
nature by machine, which led to a social revolution. Tonnie¨s
coined it the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. This
process was fuelled by economic forces and has been accom-
panied by deep feelings of alienation. In 2006, in my opinion,
something similar has happened. But this time it is not phys-
ical nature that is being tainted. This time it is literary culture
that is being replaced by literary mechanics. As the flight of
the agricultural worker to the factory sounded the start of a
social revolution, so is it to be expected (if only on economic
grounds) that the move of the individual professional to
broader contexts, driven by the realisation of policies will
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are not readily welcomed by all.
The exhaustive list of diagnose-treatment combinations
that recently made their entrance in the medical world in
the Netherlands is a striking example. This list is imple-
mented by means of IT and rules the practitioner’s work (he/
she will not get paid for non-complying treatments). A similar
development is underway in Dutch legal practice: lawyers
flock to mega-firms and start using knowledge management
systems in an organised manner. Cantonal courts have be-
come an integral part of the regional courts, and the judiciary
is struggling to maintain its independence under the Council
of the Judiciary. Policies pop up everywhere. And those poli-
cies are perfectly suited for transfer to the virtual desktop. IT
instruments can no longer be seen as simple instruments
for individual support, but must also be understood as in-
struments for the realisation of certain policies, be it of
general, administrative, security, cost or quality control in
nature. In the preceding description of the virtual desktop
of the judiciary tell-tale signs are present, indicating that
this development is also taking place there: projects such
as RechtspraaQ (introducing a quality management system)
en the infoRM program, for instance. In my opinion this
constitutes a trend: a trend that is fuelled by the powerful
combination of administrative and collective qualities
in desktop instruments. It forces organisations to search
for new equilibriums. I will call this the new digital
enforceability.
Where does it come from? In my opinion the foremost
technical motive is that there is a growing realisation that col-
lective and administrative instruments can be used to en-
hance each other’s capabilities, together with the availability
of an almost pervasive IT infrastructure. Let us look at Google
to set an example. Google clearly is a mainly cooperative ser-
vice. Google builds large searchable databases containing the
contents and locations of Internet publications. Through
Google, contributors and users of information form a global
network with each other. But Google does more, it adminis-
trates: the company saves search queries and their source
computer-addresses to process them administratively and
create interest profiles of users. This allows Google to connect
profiles with advertisements. Furthermore, Google’s popular-
ity allows it to create a lock-in situation. If you do not want to
be profiled by Google you simply should not use Google; if you
are dependent on the Internet, however, you have to take Goo-
gle for granted and stop worrying about profiling. The latter
choice is often preferred. This, in turn, leads to endless possi-
bilities for administrative supervision. Google Netherlands
(where it serves over 80% of all Internet searches) is without
any doubt able to inform the Dutch authorities with details
of a person’s Internet use in cases where Google is obliged to
do so under Dutch law.
This trend of new digital enforceability implies, mutatis
mutandis, that the integrated virtual desktop of the judiciary
will in future be in a position to report on the desktop use of
the judges – if there was a legal obligation to do so. Further,
at least in the Netherlands, since 1 January 2002 this is the
case. The obligation can be read into the new Law RO. It is
interesting to read that Law again, taking the emerging new
digital enforceability into consideration. Let me repeat:The Council is entrusted with the support of the management of
the courts and the supervision of the use of the courts’ budgets.
To carry out this task the Council is in particular concerned
with, among others, the computerization, the supply of manage-
ment information and the quality of the administrative and man-
agerial modus operandi of the courts (art 91 Wet RO). To fulfil
these goals the Council can give general orders to the administra-
tions of the courts, if management interests do so require. Before
issuing such an order, the Council asks the Board of Representa-
tives (comprised of representatives from the courts: art. 90 RO) to
voice its views (art 92. RO). By ministerial implementing regula-
tion, rules are set for financing the courts – in any case pertaining
to objective measurement of workload and to the way in which
compliance to these rules in preceding periods will be taken into
account when deciding on the budget (art 94 RO). The Council
is duty bound to provide the Minister with adequate information
(art 105 RO).
All these tasks are better performed when improved
administrative information services are available and when
the information is not reliant on ‘lock-in’ as in the Google
case, but can be enforced by the Council. These regulations
can, furthermore, be embedded in the instruments of the
virtual desktop, so there is little chance to avoid them. Judicial
independence will obtain a whole new meaning when such
instruments start taking off.
Let me slow down a bit. The virtual desktop of the judiciary
in the Netherlands has not reached this stage yet. It is ques-
tionable whether the quality of the IT services in the judiciary
is of such a standard, or that effective new forms of digital
enforceability are presently at hand. Moreover, it is highly
unlikely that the Minister of Justice and the Council of the
Judiciary feel so responsible for (or have so little trust in) our
judiciary that they would consider going to such lengths.
But still, it could happen. 9/11, Madrid and London have
shed their incidental nature, partly because measures previ-
ously thought to be legally unsavoury suddenly have become
en vogue, and have even received legal blessing. I’m referring,
for instance, to the duty to keep logs on telecom traffic data,
which has recently come into effect in the Netherlands and
in Europe. Logs containing sender and recipient details are
kept on all telephone and Internet traffic. This was formerly
exclusively for the function of invoicing. Now the additional
purpose is to facilitate the investigation of (the planning of)
criminal acts.
The trend of growing digital enforceability makes this pos-
sible. I repeat that the feared situation is not at hand right yet,
but that we should be aware of its possible emergence in the
future.
That would, in my opinion, mean the following. When the
time comes – and it will – a good reason will be presented for
it just as, employing an analogy, in the 1980s there was good
reason to prescribe hard penal sentencing guidelines in the
USA. The USA sentencing practice had proved to be otherwise
irreparably biased with the criminal’s colour of skin. Supervi-
sion is not necessarily a bad thing, not even of the judiciary.
But we should be wary, for risks concerning the quality of our
Rule of Law are involved. Risks that directly and adversely affect
the quality of our constitutional state. These issues should be
given attention in advance. The key seems to be a revaluation
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the checks and balances that secure it into place. In the con-
cluding section, then, I will turn my attention to this subject.
5. Organisational fate
Computerization does not unconditionally lead to progress.
Spam, child porn, hacking, extremist digital communities,
computer trespassing, misuse of facilities and the release of
confidential information are all very common. Computeriza-
tion is relatively new and is proliferating at an explosive
speed. Societies are in transition – becoming information soci-
eties. Advice offered and decisions made by Government are
dominated by technical and (often neo-classical) economic
motives, hardly ever by legal insight. A scientific monograph
titled ‘Legal instruments, their development and the quality
of the constitutional state’ (paraphrasing North, 1990) is not
to be expected anytime soon in the Netherlands. Why is it
that the prominent position legal scholarship once held in ju-
dicial political decision making in the Netherlands has given
way to economists, social scientists and computer scientists
(e.g. Goudriaan, 2003; Dekker et al., 2004; van Velthoven,
2005)? Does that mean our normative Rule of Law is at risk
of being replaced by some socio-economic Rule of Administra-
tion? What consequences arise for the computerization of the
judiciary, and therefore for the judiciary itself? Can we learn
something from the economists? And if jurisprudence is to
play a stronger role, what should that be?
In 1937 Ronald Coase asked a similar question about eco-
nomics to economists. He wondered how they could be so au-
dacious as to give government advice based on assumptions
(the existence of frictionless markets and omniscient parties)
that were so blatantly flawed. To set an example, he investi-
gated the puzzle why in practice it was sometimes more effi-
cient to bundle forces into hierarchical organisations (firms)
than to rely on the market for achieving that efficiency. Tradi-
tional assumptions in economics taught that allowing the
market to do its work would lead to the highest efficiency.
Practice showed otherwise. The cause of this discrepancy,
according to Coase, lay in the costs involved in information
gathering (related for instance to the process of figuring out
which parties offer the highest returns versus the lowest
values and costs) and in the costs of entering into spot con-
tracts with those parties selected instead of a long term rela-
tionship (transaction costs). Those costs make it sometimes
more efficient to organise some processes within firms than
to let them happen on the free market.
Proceeding from this analytically based result it becomes
possible to start working on explanations for the emergence
and sustainability of organizations and on reasoning about
their optimum size and their optimum level of specialisation –
also within the judiciary. After all, any organization comes at
a certain cost too. Once these (marginal) costs outsize the
benefit of reduced transaction costs, the organization’s size
has reached its rational limit.
In order to make claims on that subject, one needs to point
out what the relevant internal structures of an organization
are. In the current context an organization needs to have
internal regulations (economists call them institutions) fordefining internal, hierarchical relationships and those regula-
tions need to be upheld. There also need to be external rules
(contracts, general conditions) in order to create reliability
for cooperation with external partners. And, finally, there
needs to be some even more general (and effective) Rule of
Law-like context, supporting a society where organizational
transactions may flourish durably (see also Ellickson, 1991
and North, 1990).
Acceptance of internal and external rules of an organiza-
tion means that parties who enter into contract with the orga-
nization give up some autonomy in exchange for certain
benefits. Thus, the organisation of transactions can be ana-
lysed into collections of agency relationships in a trusted soci-
ety – and individual agency relationships demand a minimal
level of reciprocity for duration or sustainability. (Reciprocal
agency relationships as fundamental to law and to economy,
have a long-standing pedigree: i.e. Hobbes, 1651; Smith,
1776. They also emerge consistently in more recent game-the-
oretic models explaining cooperation.)
Looking from this perspective at the Council of the Judi-
ciary, an organization makes reciprocity between the judiciary
and the courts and between the courts and the Council a point
of interest. This reciprocity can be articulated as the balance
struck between the benefits the courts derive from working
under the supervision of the Council and the disadvantages
they experience from that system. In the Netherlands, opin-
ions on these reciprocities can be communicated between
the Council and the Board of Representatives, which is pro-
vided for by law (art 90 RO).
Inherent to hierarchical organisations is the fact that those
who bear responsibility in the organisation should see their
appointed tasks as the legitimisation of the internal rules
they set and enforce. The very practice of rule promulgation
and enforcement induces notions of sovereignty that, in the
long run, need to be constrained. Jurisprudence has grown
up with the constitutional ‘‘separation of powers’’ in order
to curb excess. It is based on reciprocity. When we consider
the organization of Council for the Judiciary, we have to
keep this in mind.
Unlike businesses, the Council’s goal is not profit but the
realisation of quality adjudication practices. To achieve its
goal, the Council can set rules. As has been said before, the in-
creasing use of IT instruments on the virtual desktop gener-
ates more and more data to monitor the performance of
individual judges, the resources they consult, the time they
need to digest them, who they digitally confer with, and
what digital dangers they run, etc. This growing abundance
of digital data lowers the transaction costs of the Council’s
rule design, promulgation and enforcement efforts, since
most of the data can be processed automatically (e.g., by
means of workflow management and management informa-
tion systems). Thus, there also exists economic appeal to
growing digital enforceability in the judiciary. I would think
that internal reciprocity – the perception of mutual benefit
through internal transactions between judges, the courts
and the Council – in the light of a durable judiciary should
be the primary point of concern.
The preceding observations lead to the practical conclu-
sion that – for the organization of the judiciary in the Nether-
lands – the (internal parliament-like) role of the Board of
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serves extra attention. Judging the wording of the executive
ruling on the Board of Representatives, the legislator is aware
of this important role (Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 352). A few
citations from the Recitals introducing the Act read as follows:
 ‘‘The Board will monitor whether the Council respects the
judicial independence;
 The Board’s purpose is to ensure that, in the Courts, there
remains durable support for the Council; and
 The Council will supply the Board with the information nec-
essary for the realisation of its tasks.’’
Nevertheless, it is hard to find information on the actual
performance of the Board. A short reference is made in the
Council’s strategic plan called the ‘Agenda for justice 2005–
2008 (Den Haag: July 2004)’. It states that the Board took part
in a preparatory conference on 22 April 2004 and that a recom-
mendation was given on the subject on 16 June of the same
year. The Agenda was published in July. Apparently, drafting
the Agenda in compliance with the Board’s recommendations
did not require much time.
6. Afterthoughts
First, it is appropriate to put the rhetorical comparison I made
in the introduction into the right perspective. The suggestion
that IT services are gaining power over the Dutch judiciary
seems absurd, at least formally. The judges, the courts, the
Council and the minister are still the ones responsible. This
is true also for the IT services they deploy and use. Still, inde-
pendence needs to be organized properly, especially where it
clashes with considerations of economic efficiency and ade-
quate specialization. Responsibility in the face of changing
organization and specialization requires sensitive agency
activities, that is, agency frameworks that do not make the
independent responsibility of our judiciary ‘leak away’ to
technicians and administrators who love policies but have
no judicial responsibility at all.
Second, the relation between the responsible principal and
IT service provider is notoriously difficult. The main reason is
often found in the information asymmetry that is almost
always present between principal (legal professional) and pro-
vider (computer scientist). This asymmetry makes it even
harder than normal to judge reciprocities. The answer to
questions about the organizational design of IT services for
the judiciary is therefore hard to find. Three different scenar-
ios have become common: (a) Application Service Providers
(where the service is provided through networks and man-
aged by the provider – an extreme form of outsourcing); (b)
outsourcing of just the development and maintenance of the
application while the administration is kept in-house; or (c)
keeping the development and administration of applications
entirely in-house (currently, the Dutch Council of the Judiciary
carefully nurses in-house IT expertise). Whichever option is
chosen, from experience it can be said that it is vital that the
principal and the provider have knowledge of each other’s
role and are able to communicate at an adequate level. If
that does not apply, we do run the risk that was pictured inthe introduction: the expert dictates the conditions under
which the layman uses the service.
Interestingly, parts of the American Sarbanes–Oxley Act
(2002) address the problem, be it in a different context. It pro-
tects shareholder interests gained at the New York Stock
Exchange by requiring to keep shareholders abreast of any
company information pertaining to the stock value. This in-
volves information system integrity. The Act makes the
CEO and the CFO personally liable for the quality of the infor-
mation processing involved. It has had great effect on IT-
governance practices in these firms. And somewhat more in
context: IT-flops not only occur in Dutch Administrations; in
the USA, for instance, an Act has been promulgated that is
meant to prevent future IT disasters in Federal Administra-
tion: the Clinger–Cohen Act of 1996. Perhaps the Dutch legisla-
tor will find studying such legislation and their rationales
beneficial.
Third, considering the IT-projects that our Council for the
Judiciary has in operation currently, the state of affairs of IT
and the Dutch Judiciary can be described as follows. There is
a kaleidoscopic abundance of IT services available in the desk-
top, which is considered to demonstrate inadequate interop-
erability – mainly as a result of the fact that judiciary
principals in IT-projects used to show themselves as ‘islands
of independence.’ As from 1 January 2002, the Dutch Council
for the Judiciary has been officially established, thus ending
this organizational fragmentation. Its course is moving with
the new digital enforceability trend as previously analyzed.
It will presently result in the abundant availability of manage-
ment data and, consequently, it will soon after raise new
questions about organizational equilibriums within the Dutch
Judiciary. Relevant rules concerning representing the individ-
ual courts are in place. There is little evidence, however, that
the Board of Representative has already claimed its position
of control. My conclusions are that with the introduction of
the new enforceability into the Dutch organization of the
udiciary, new equilibriums have to be found between
the morals of the Law, of the Market and of IT-servicing –
and that finding these equilibriums has not yet shown in
practice. Worse even, the articulation of adequate, updated
conceptualizations and evaluation procedures seems to lag
behind in the Netherlands.
Fourth, there might be interest in how the new enforceabil-
ity, as described above, is faced in other countries. As I do not
have the resources to investigate the issue in more depth, I
venture an opinion based on sources made accessible through
Symposium, 2004.
Let me first mention, however, that the new enforceability
concerning the judiciary is a species of what Roger Clarke has
coined ‘‘dataveillance’’ in his visionary article in 1988 (Clarke,
1988). In that paper he claims that surveillance is one of the
elements of tyranny. What – at least to me – seems to get
more than enough attention is the phenomenon of the con-
cern expressed in Clarke, 1988. This follows the trend set by
Huxley, 1932 and Orwell, 1949 in focusing on government
surveillance of ‘us, the people’ and by subsequently entering
the debate on privacy. Important as this may be, I have
stressed something else here: the issue of the impact to be
expected of digital surveillance capabilities of the government
on our constitutionally grounded, institutionally independent
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dence interest now or at least soon. After all, we would hardly
wish to be caught unawares by constitutional changes that
have ‘simply occurred’ and lack deliberate and democratic
legitimacy.
This type of concern is traditionally shared inside the USA
(see: The Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence, 1997, and Symposium, 2006) as jurisdiction,
responsibility and independence of government institutions
are well-established core issues in the constitutional debate
over there. However, the presidential initiatives concerning
the War on Terror and Guanta´namo Bay do currently claim
priority over considerations about new enforceability and
the judiciary. And rightly so, as the organizational position
of Courtroom 21 shows that the efficiency of the judiciary is
not governed by any central Administration in the USA.
Here I see a difference with European countries and Singa-
pore, where the tendency is to centralize IT service provision
for the courts. In the International Conference on the Legal
and Policy Implications of Courtroom technology, held at Wil-
liamsburg on 13 February 2004, the contributions covered
courtroom technology in the USA (Lederer, 2004; Wiggins,
2004), in Singapore (Magnus, 2004), in Australia (MacDonald
and Wallace, 2004), in Canada (Borkowski, 2004), in the UK
(Barnett, 2004; Brooke, 2004) and in Europe (Giuffrida, 2004)
without a single one of the speakers even mentioning judicial
independence and responsibility in relation to dataveillance
as an issue deserving attention.
This bothers me. I do understand that efficiency and better
co-ordination are worthy values. But so is judicial responsibil-
ity and independence. And I do know from earlier projects
(e.g., Lodder et al., 2001) that major reorganizations of the Eu-
ropean judiciaries have been going on, often resulting in inter-
mediary institutions like the Dutch Council for the Judiciary. I
am convinced that agencies will not only grab extra jurisdic-
tion where they can, but also that they will eventually go on
to abuse their power if countervailing institutions are not
properly organised. After all, power corrupts – and let us not
forget that to protect us against government corruption was
the reason why we needed a responsible and independent
judiciary in the first place.
Aernout Schmidt (a.h.j.schmidt@law.leidenuniv.nl) Professor of
Law and ICT at Leiden University and Director of eLaw@Leiden,
Centre for Law in the Information Society.
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